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The advantage of price-taking behavior in achieving relative proﬁtability in oligopolistic quantity competition has
been much appreciated recently from economic dynamics and evolutionary game theory, respectively. The current
research intends to provide a direct economic interpretation as well as intuitive justiﬁcation and further to build a
linkage between diﬀerent perspectives. In particular, a detailed illustration of an arbitrary oligopoly that produce a
homogenous product is presented. So long as the outputs of other ﬁrms are ﬁxed and the residual demand is downward
sloping, for any two identical ﬁrms whose cost functions are convex, their output space can be divided symmetrically
into mutually exclusive relatively proﬁtability regimes. Furthermore, there exist inﬁnitely many relative-proﬁtability
reactions for each ﬁrm in such “residual” duopoly, all of which intersect at the “residual” Walrasian equilibrium.
This suggests that sticking to this dynamical equilibrium output constantly (i.e., the static Walrasian strategy) turns
out to be a relative-proﬁtability strategy at each period. On the other hand, regardless of what strategies its rival
may take, a ﬁrm adopting price-taking strategy or more generally deﬁned dynamic Walrasian strategies can achieve
the relative proﬁtability if an intertemporal equilibrium is reached. The methodology adopted and the conclusions
arrived clarify the confusions and misunderstandings due to the diﬀerent usages of same terminologies under diﬀerent
frameworks and generalize the previous available results in the literature to a higher level and a broader context.
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11. INTRODUCTION
One of the lessons learned from basic microeconomics is that a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm will always leverage on
market information as well as the behavioral rule of its rivals when making its output decision. Given limited infor-
mation about the market as well as its rivals’ behavior (which varies from case to case), it is invariably assumed that
a quantity competing oligopolistic ﬁrm’s best response is to maximize myopically its instantaneous absolute payoff,
giving rise to a reaction function of its rival’s expected output for the period. It is deemed economically irrational if
a ﬁrm either ignores or is ignorant about its market power and instead adopts some simple strategy in oligopolistic
competition.
However, such beliefs were questioned and challenged from different perspectives over last decade. A huge body
of literature from evolutionary game theory revealed that producing at the competitive equilibrium output level (or
adopting static Walrasian strategy) is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) when all ﬁrms have identical technology.
The study of Cournot oligopolies where ﬁrms learn through imitation of success can be traced back as early as to
Alchian [1950]. Schaffer (1989) demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural selection and shows that
the proﬁt-maximizers are not necessarily the best survivors. In a simple context with just two quantity-setting ﬁrms
which have identical and constant marginal costs, only price-taking behavior is evolutionarily stable. Vega-Redondo
(1997)shows that, for a symmetric oligopolyin which all ﬁrms have identical non-decreasingreturn technology,when
some ﬁrms produce at the competitive equilibrium level and the others produce at an same identical mutant level (the
mutantstrategy),theformerwill gainrelativehigherproﬁtthanthe latter. Thisresultis independentofboththenumber
of mutant ﬁrms and of the mutant outputs so long as they are identical. The ESS characteristics of static Walrasian
strategy have lately been extended in different directions under different speciﬁcations by Schenk-Hoppe (2000) and
Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005), etc.
The relative proﬁtability of price-taking behavior in the dynamic sense where a ﬁrm produces at an output level
that equates thecurrentmarginalcost to price-expectation,has beenexploredin Huang(2002),whereit is showedthat,
in an oligopolistic industry where all ﬁrms equipped with identical technology1, the price-takers always triumph over
the other ﬁrms at a dynamical equilibrium in terms of relative proﬁtability, regardless of what strategies (dynamical
behavioral rules) these non-price-takers may adopt. Therefore, the price-taking behavior is appreciated without the
critical assumption of “imitations” in evolutionary game theory analysis.
The aims of current research are i) to study the relative proﬁtability of Walrasian strategies in general under an
uniﬁed framework so that intuitive economic interpretations can be justiﬁed for both static and dynamic Walrasian
strategies and mutual implication are explored. ii) to generalize the previous results to more general oligopolistic
industry with heterogeneous technologies.
All these goals are achieved through characterizing the relative-proﬁtability regime in the output space. In an
arbitrary oligopoly,so long as the outputs of other ﬁrms are ﬁxed, for any two ﬁrms who share an identical technology
1It will be made clear later that the assumption of uniform technology for all ﬁrms are not necessary.
2that exhibits non-increasing return to scale, their output space can be divided uniquely into symmetrically located as
well as mutuallyexclusiverelative-proﬁtabilityregimes. Foreach ﬁrm in such“residual”duopoly,thereexist inﬁnitely
many relative-proﬁtable strategies, among which are the dynamic Walrasian strategies and a unique static Walrasian
strategy. While adopting static Walrasian strategy can achieve relative proﬁtability against any other strategies at
each period of dynamical adjustment so long as the market environment is ﬁxed, the dynamic Walrasian strategies,
which demand minimum market information, possess relative-proﬁtability only when an intertemporal equilibrium is
reached. Nevertheless, the dynamic Walrasian strategies are robust to changes in market environment such as residual
demand, the entry and exit of oligopolistic ﬁrms, the technological advances et. al. Finally, the dynamic Walrasian
strategy would converge to the static Walrasian strategy, should ﬁrms imitate each other and strive for the relative
successes as assumed in the evolutionary game theory.
The remaining discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the concept of relative-proﬁtability curve
and relative-proﬁtability regimes in a symmetric residual-duopoly. The uniqueness of relative-proﬁtability curve is
ensured providingthat the cost function is convex. The concepts of relative-proﬁtabilitystrategy and efﬁcient relative-
proﬁtability,i.e., the strategythat bringsaboutthemaximumproﬁtdifference,are introducedin Section 3, in which the
compromiseofrelative-proﬁtabilitywith absoluteproﬁtabilityis explored. Section4is thecoreofthis article, in which
the concept of dynamic Walrasian strategy is formallydeﬁned and its linkage to the static Walrasian strategy discussed
in evolutionary game theory is built. Concluding remarks as well as the further research are provided in Section
6. For the sake of presentation, some straightforward or tedious analytical derivations are included in Appendix A.
Typical characteristics of relative-proﬁtability curve and Walrasian reaction curve are provided in Appendix B and C,
respectively.
2. RELATIVE-PROFITABILITY FRONTIER
Consider an oligopoly market, in which N ﬁrms produce a homogeneousproduct with quantity qi
t, i = 1,2,...,N,
at period t. The market inverse demand for the product is given by pt = ˜ D( ˜ Qt), where ˜ D′ ≤ 0. The conventional
assumption that ˜ Qt =
 N
i=1 qi
t, i.e., the actual market price adjusts to the demand so as to clear the market at every
period applies.
Our goal is compare the relative proﬁtability of any two ﬁrms that have an identical technology exhibiting non-
increasing returns to scale and thus an identical convex cost function C(q), with C′′ ≥ 0, in such an oligopoly. To
concentrate on the interaction between these two ﬁrms, we refer them as X and Y, and assume that the output levels of
all other ﬁrms are ﬁxed so the residual market demand for these two ﬁrms is D = D(x + y) ˙ = ˜ D(x + y + ˜ Q′), where
x and y denote the outputs of these two ﬁrms and let ˜ Q′ ˙ =
 
j\x,y qj = ˜ Q − x − y denote the outputs of all other
ﬁrms. For the convenience of latter reference, we shall call X and Y as a residual-duopoly and similarly use preﬁx
“residual-”on relevantterminologiesto indicate that the analysis andthe conclusionarrivedfor anytwo identicalﬁrms
in an oligopoly with all other ﬁrm’s outputs being ﬁxed.
We start with some basic deﬁnitions for the residual-duopoly.
32.1. Relative-proﬁtability frontier
Let Q be the economically meaningfuldomain for x and y when ˜ Q′ is given. With D′ < 0 implied by ˜ D′ < 0, the
proﬁts gained by ﬁrms X and Y, are then given by:
π
q (x,y) = D(x + y)q − C (q), with q = x,y ∈ Q.
Denote the relative proﬁt for Firm X, ∆xy (x,y), as its proﬁt difference as compared to Firm Y, that is,
∆xy (x,y) ˙ =πx (x,y) − πy (x,y).
Definition 1. Equal-proﬁtability curve in x-y plane refers to the curves in the economically meaningful
domain which give rise to πx = πy, that is, ∆xy (x,y) = ∆yx (x,y) = 0.
Definition 2. Relative proﬁtability regime (for Firm X) is a (x,y) subset in the economically meaningful
domain Q in which Firm X makes a higher proﬁt relative to his rival Firm Y, that is, ∆xy (x,y) > 0.
The 45-degree diagonal line in x-y plane or equivalently, y = x, is a trivial equal-proﬁtability curve (which arises
from the fact that both ﬁrms have an identical cost.) In addition to this trivial equal-proﬁtability curve, there also
exist non-trivial equal-proﬁtability curves.In Figure 1, with residual demand being ﬁxed at D(Q) = 1/Q, typical
3-dimensional plots for ∆xy (positive portion only) are provided for three different cost functions: (a) strict convex
cost: c1 (q) = cq2/2,c > 0; (b) strict concave cost: c2 (q) = cq,c > 0 and (c) S-shape cost (convex-concave) cost:
c3 (q) = csin
2 (πq/d),c,d > 0.
For a general residual-duopoly, the ﬁrst question that interests us is whether this non-trivial equal-proﬁtability
curve is unique when the residual demand function and cost function satisfy certain requirements. A deﬁnite and
positive answer is provided in the next theorem. To distinguish this unique non-trivial equal-proﬁtability curve with
the trivial one, we shall call it relative-proﬁtability frontier hereafter.
Definition 3. Relative-proﬁtability frontier: all (x,y) combination in the economically meaningful
domain Q such that ∆xy (x,y) = 0 but x  = y.
A critical concept that relates to the relative-proﬁtability frontier and plays an important role in the proof of the
following theorem is the Walrasian reaction curve.
Definition 4. Walrasian reaction curve By Walrasian reaction for Firm X, we mean that for any
given rival’s output y, Firm X responds by equating its marginal cost to the expected price. That is, the
reaction to a given y, denoted as Rw, is implicitly deﬁned by
D(Rw (y) + y) = C′ (Rw (y)). (1)
Theorem 1. (Uniqueness Theorem) When C is convex, that is, C′′ (q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ Q, and D′ < 0,





























(c) ∆xy for S-shape cost: C3(q) = sin2(π
4q)
FIG. 1 Proﬁt Diﬀerence ∆xy(x,y) (D(Q) = 1/Q)
5i) there exists a unique relative-proﬁtability frontier given by fe such that ∆xy (x,fe (x)) = 0 and x =
fe (x) if and only if x = qw, where qw is uniquely determined from the following identity
C′ (qw) = D(2qw).
ii) f′
e (x) ≤ 0, where the equality holds only at ﬁnite points;
iii)with the trivial equal-proﬁtability curve and the relative-proﬁtability frontier fe, the economically mean-
ingful domain Q in x-y plane is divided into four quadrants, the vertex of which is characterized by the residual
Walrasian equilibrium Ew = (qw,qw). While the upper and lower quadrants forms the relative-proﬁtability
regime for Firm X, the left and the right quadrants is the relative-proﬁtability regime for Firm Y.
Proof. (see Appendix A)
Figure 2 depicts several examples of the relative-proﬁtability frontiers (as well as the Walrasian reaction curves).
It needs to mention that, for a duopoly, the residual Walrasian equilibrium simpliﬁes to the competitive equilibrium.
Remark 1. For monotonically downward sloping demand D′ < 0, the convexity of cost, that is, C′′ ≥ 0,
is a suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness (as well as the monotonicity) of relative-proﬁtability frontier fe. If
the convexity of cost can’t be warranted, there exist situations where multiple non-trivial equal-proﬁtability
curves coexist, as illustrated in Figure 1.(c), as well as the possibility that the non-trivial equal-proﬁtability
curve is not monotonic, as illustrated in Figure 1.(b).
2.2. Characterize the relative-proﬁtability frontier fe
Due to the fact that πx (x,y) ≡ πy (y,x), the relative-proﬁtability frontier fe must be symmetric with respect to
the 45-degree line. This kind of anti-symmetricity is analytically characterized by
f
−1
e (x) = fe (x)
which demands that f′
e (qw) = −1, where qw is the residual Walrasian output. Formally, we have
Proposition 1. The relative-proﬁtability frontier fe is symmetric with respect to the 45-degree line,




C′ (x) − D(x + y) − (x − y)D′ (x + y)
C′ (y) − D(x + y) + (x − y)D′ (x + y)
< 0 (2)
and f′
e (qw) = −1.
The second-order derivative of fe has very complicated analytical expression, which makes the analysis of the
second-order derivative property of fe impossible. We shall bypass this obstacle by evaluating the relative magnitude
of absolute value of f′
e in comparison to unity. Due to the symmetricity of fe, we only need to discuss the lower
portion of fe, that is x ≥ qw ≥ y. It follows from
|f′
e| − 1 =
C′ (x) + C′ (y) − 2D






















































(d) D(Q) = 1/Q, C(q) = 2
3q3/2
FIG. 2 Illustrative relative proﬁtability regimes
7as well as the fact that D(x + y) = (C (x) − C (y))/(x − y) when y = fe (x), we have
Proposition 2. For convex C, we have |f′
e| ≶ 1 for all x ≥ qw ≥ y if the inequality
C′ (x) + C′ (y)
2
≶
C (x) − C (y)
x − y
(3)
holds for all x > y > 0.
Condition (3) provides us with the information about the concavity of fe near the residual Walrasian equilibrium
due to the fact that limx→qw f′′
e ≷ 0 if and only if limx→q
−
w |f′
e| ≶ 1. Geometrically, the non-trivial equal proﬁtability
curve fe is convex (concave) around Ew if the average marginal costs for any two points exceeds the slope of chord
that connects the correspondingpoints in the cost function C.
For instance, if C (q) = cqα, α ≥ 1, let F (x,y) = (C′ (x) + C′ (y))/2 − (C (x) − C (y))/(x − y), then we
have


















2 > 0 −
We see that f′′
e = 0 if α = 1,2. For α = 3/2 and 3, the relative-proﬁtability frontiers are convex and concave,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 for two different residual demand functions.
The quadratic cost is most widely adopted as example in the economical analysis. The proof of the following
interesting fact is provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. When cost function C is quadratic, that is, C (q) = a + bq + cq2 with a,b,c ≥ 0, then
the relative-proﬁtability frontier fe is always a straight line with slope −1 so long as the residual demand D
satisﬁes the basic requirement D(0) > b. Moreover, when the cost is linear (c = 0), the relative-proﬁtability
frontier geometrically coincides with the Walrasian reaction Rw.
The relative-proﬁtability regimes expand and shrink with changes in the residual demand as well as the cost
function. Understanding the impacts of the various changes in market characteristics on the shape and location of fe
enable us to study the comparative statics when technology changes as well as when the entry and exit are allowed.
The following proposition can be easily veriﬁed.
Proposition 4. Comparative eﬀects of the relative-proﬁtability frontier
i) For the same residual demand function D, let f
(i)
e be the relative-proﬁtability frontier when C(i) is
given as the cost function of the residual duopoly, i = 1,2. If C(2) (q) ≥ C(1) (q) for all q ∈ Q, then we
have f
(2)
e (x) ≤ f
(1)
e (x) for all x ∈ Q. In other words, increasing the cost of residual-duopoly shifts the
relative-proﬁtability frontier downward.
8ii) For a given identical cost C, let f
(i)
e be the relative-proﬁtability frontier when the residual demand is
given by D(i), i = 1,2. If D(2) (x + y) ≤ D(1) (x + y) for all x,y ∈ Q, then we have f
(2)
e (x) ≤ f
(1)
e (x) for
all x ∈ Q. In other words, increasing the residual demand shifts the equal-proﬁtability curve upward.
3. RELATIVE-PROFITABILITY STRATEGIES
In the theory of ﬁrms, all ﬁrms are commonly assumed to seek maximized (absolute) proﬁt. However, economists
have pondered over the deﬁnition and/or criteria of proﬁt for quite some time (Bernstein 1953). A directly related
question to the deﬁnition and/or criteria of proﬁt is apparently what are the ﬁrms’ goals. This question, nevertheless,
also remained very much an open debate in the history of economics (Osborne 1964). In Baumol’s seminal work
(Baumol (1959)), it was suggested that in the real world, a ﬁrm is actually maximizing the sales revenue subject to
minimum proﬁt requirement rather than maximizing absolute proﬁt. The pioneering work on the theory of bounded
rational behavior by Simon (1959)further stimulated the discussion of ﬁrm’s objectives. The view that “the ﬁrm seeks
to attaina satisfactorylevelofproﬁtsratherthana maximumlevel”hadreceivedoverwhelmingresponsesin1960s. As
Lamberton (1960) had argued, “when dealing with the large, multi-product, oligopolistic ﬁrm whose particular (and
general) expectations are held with uncertainty the hypothesis is clearly a plausible one. Business management will
frequently be thinking in terms of simultaneous, discontinuous changes in a large number of variables with which it is
concerned and will have recourse to conventional procedures, one which may be the adoption of a proﬁt target....The
target may be indicated according to a variety of methods, e.g., percentage on turnover or capital employed, and
pursued by a single policy under stable conditions.”
The relevance of proﬁt maximization is much less obvious for large modern corporations where ownership and
control of the ﬁrm are separated: the former in the hands of potentially diffused shareholders and the latter vested
in professional management. This separation provides a considerable degree of decision-making autonomy of man-
agers, whose behavior may deviate signiﬁcantly from what is implied by proﬁt maximization. It is well known in the
strategic-managerial-incentivesliterature that a ﬁrm’s owner can increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁt by hiring a manager and as-
signing him an objective different from proﬁt-maximization (Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987)). A literature relevant to relative proﬁtability is from Lundgren (1996), where a method to eliminate incentives
for collusion by making managerial compensation, which depends on relative proﬁts rather than absolute proﬁts, is
proposed. This alteration of managerial incentives sets up a zero-sum game among the ﬁrms in an industry, yielding
the result that ﬁrms no longer have incentive to collude, either actually or tacitly, with regards to prices or outputs.
Recently, increasing appreciation of Walrasian equilibrium output from evolutionary and game theoretic perspec-
tives have once again provided alternative views to proﬁt maximization as ﬁrms’ primary objectives. The essence
of evolutionary economics lies in the evaluation of relative success of different strategies. Rational ﬁrms imitate the
successful strategies, i.e., the strategies that can achieve a proﬁt higher than the average. Thus, during an evolutionary
process, it is not the absolute proﬁt but the relative proﬁt that matters. Therefore, pursuing a goal of achieving relative
9proﬁt advantage is an economically justiﬁed in oligopolistic competition. A detailed examination of this concept is
warranted.
3.1. Relative-proﬁtability strategy
Definition 5. Relative-proﬁtability reaction (response) Given a rival’s output level, the ﬁrm reacts with
an output that can lead to a higher relative proﬁt at each period during the dynamically oligopolistic
competition.
Relative-proﬁtability strategy In dynamic oligopolistic competition, a relative-proﬁtability strategy is any
open-loop or close-loop strategy such that all the equilibrium outputs lie on a relative-proﬁtability reaction
curve.
It needs to emphasize that the relative-proﬁtability strategy is a broader concept than the relative-proﬁtability
reaction. With full information about the current output of its rival, a ﬁrm responding with the relative-proﬁtability
reactionisadoptingarelative-proﬁtabilitystrategy. Arelative-proﬁtabilitystrategy,however,canbecomposedofﬁnite
relative-proﬁtability responses (to current or past outputs of its rivals), or a simple response to the past price-level, or
even producing at a constant output like qw.
Geometrically,all relative-proﬁtabilityreactions for Firm X must lie in the relative-proﬁtabilityregimefor Firm X.
For each ﬁrm of residual-duopoly,there exist inﬁnitely many relative-proﬁtabilitystrategies, all of them must intersect
at the residual Walrasian equilibrium. Then the natural question that arises is which one of them can maximize the
relative proﬁt, should a ﬁrm’s goal be to maximize the relative proﬁt intentionally. This section is conducted under
such motivation.
Definition 6. Eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability reaction is the relative-proﬁtability reaction that maximizes
the relative proﬁt for any given rival’s output.
Eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability strategy is any dynamical strategy that guarantees that a dynamical equi-
librium will lies on the eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability reaction curve.
The efﬁcient relative-proﬁtability reaction therefore reﬂects the maximum possible difference in proﬁt when the
rival’s output is given. This reaction naturally requires information about the residual demand function. With knowl-
edge of the residual demand D and the rival’s output y, Firm X maximizes its relative proﬁt given by ∆xy =
(x − y)D(x + y) − (C (x) − C (y)). A local maximum of ∆xy occurs at
C′ (x) = D + (x − y)D′ (4)
if ∂2∆xy/∂x2 = 2D′ + (x − y)D′′ − C′′ (x) < 0.
Denote the efﬁcient relative-proﬁtability reaction implicitly deﬁned in (4) as x = Rr (y), and the Cournot best-
response as x = Rc (y), which is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order proﬁt maximization condition as
C
′ (x) = D + xD
′. (5)
10We should be able to infer from (4) and (5) that Rr (y) > Rc (y) for all y > 0.
However, in comparing with the Walrasian reaction Rw (y) deﬁned in (1), we have the following generic observa-
tion:
Theorem 2. If C′′ ≥ 0, we have Rw (y) > Rr (y) > Rc (y) for y < qw and Rr (y) > Rw (y) > Rc (y) for
y > qw.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If C′′ (q) ≡ 0 for all q ∈ Q, that is, C′ (q) ≡ c, Rw (y) coincides with the equal-proﬁtability curve as well as the
normal-proﬁtability curve. Therefore, for any y > qw, with efﬁcient relative-proﬁtability reaction, both ﬁrm X and Y
make negative proﬁt while Firm Y loses more. To maintain a positive proﬁt, the output of Firm Y must be less than
qw.
Remark 2. The eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability strategy x = Rr (y) implicitly deﬁned in (4) is independent
of the cost function of Y and hence can be generalized to the cases in which two ﬁrms have diﬀerent cost
functions.
Example 1. For a residual-duopoly consisting of Firm X and Y, assume the cost function is given by
C (q) = cq2/2. When the residual demand take the two forms that are most commonly seen: linear demand
D(Q) = 1 − Q and iso-elastic demand D(Q) = 1/Q, the relevant reaction curves are summarized in the
following table.
D(Q) = 1 − Q D(Q) = 1/Q
fe (x)
















Rw (y) (1 − y)/(1 + c)
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Table 1: Reaction curves with C (q) = q2/2
The relevant curves are illustrated in Figure 3 (a), from which we make the following observations for
both cases:
i) Rw (y) > Rr (y) > Rc (y) for y < qw and Rr (y) > Rw (y) > Rc (y) for y > qw, as suggested in Theorem
2;
ii) Relative-proﬁtability frontier fe is a straight line, as implied by Proposition 3
iii) When the residual demand is linear, Rr = qw, a fact to be veriﬁed in Proposition 4 of next section.
iv) ∆xy (qw,y) > 0, if y  = qw. For any given y, ∆xy (x,y) increases from zero (when x = y) to its

































D = a/(x + y)































D = 1/(x + y)































D = 1/(x + y)
(c) Smooth combination of Rc and fe
FIG. 3 Relative proﬁtability and Absolute proﬁtability
123.2. Reconciling relative-proﬁtability with absolute proﬁtability
As have been discussed, a ﬁrm’s objective may be to maximize if not simply maintain the relative-proﬁtability.
Condition on the fact that a ﬁrm’s main priority is to maintain relative-proﬁtability, we ask if the ﬁrm is able to
maximize absolute proﬁt at the same time. The answer is positive when the rival’s output falls in the certain range.
Actually, it can be veriﬁed that if a ﬁrm adopts Cournot best-response in a residual duopoly, two sections of this
best-response actually pass through its relative-proﬁtability regimes, one is below and the other is above the residual
Walrasian equilibrium. In other words, any point on these two sections of the best response function not only allows
the ﬁrm to achieve the highest absolute proﬁt given its rival’s output level but also ensures that the ﬁrm makes higher
proﬁt relative to its rival. Therefore, these two sections of best-response themselves can in fact be interpreted as
the relative-proﬁtability strategy that achieves the highest absolute proﬁt level. When the main objective of relative
proﬁtability is not met, the ﬁrm is willing to give up the opportunity of making the maximum absolute proﬁt and
thus responds differently from Cournot-best response. Such compromise can be supplemented either with an equal
proﬁtability (so that to main certain absolutely proﬁtability) or with efﬁcient relative-proﬁtabilityresponse, depending
on the proﬁtability preference of the ﬁrm.
Example 2. Following the settings of Example 1.
A direct combination of Rc and Rr can be constructed with
x = Rcr (y) =
 
Rc (y), y ∈ [0,qc) ∪ [yrc,∞),
Rr (y), y ∈ [qc,yrc],
where yrc corresponds to the y value at the intersection point of Rc and fe. When y ∈ [qc,yrc], the ﬁrm
cannot achieve relative proﬁtability if it adopts the Cournot-best response and thus it switches to maximizing
the relative proﬁt. Its reaction function is thus Rr (y). Otherwise, since the goal of relative proﬁtability is
achieved, it will then sought to maximize the absolute proﬁt by selecting the Cournot-best response, which
is given by Rc (y). We notice that the discontinuity inevitably occur at y = qc as well as at y = yrc, as
illustrated by the thick curve in Figure 3.(b)
Alternatively, the ﬁrm may choose to maximize absolute proﬁt given that relative proﬁtability is main-
tained when y ∈ [qc,yrc].To achieve this secondary objective, the ﬁrm will choose to react according to y
when y ∈ (qc,qw) and f−1
e (y) when y ∈ (qw,yrc), where f−1
e (y) is the inverse of fe. The reaction is thus
summarized by




Rc (y), y ∈ [0,qc) ∪ [yrc,∞),
y, y ∈ (qc,qw),
f−1
e (y), y ∈ (qw,yrc),
and is illustrated by the thick curve in Figure 3.(c).
4. WALRASIAN BEHAVIORS IN GENERAL
Always stick to your proved strategy!
—Another Chinese Philosophical Quotation
13In the proof of Theorem 1, we have actually shown that, when x > (<)y, the relative-proﬁtability frontier fe lies
ontheleft(right)handside ofthe inverseoftheWalrasian reactioncurvefw, respectively. This inturnsuggeststhat the
Walrasian reactionx = Rw (y), foranygiveny, lies in the relative-proﬁtabilityregimeofX, or equivalently,Walrasian
reaction is one of the relative-proﬁtabilityreactions. On the other hand, since the center of relative-proﬁtabilityregime
is the residual Walrasian equilibrium Ew = (qw,qw), ﬁxing the output level directly at the constant level of qw is
another simple relative-proﬁtability strategy. This section will explore further the relative implications and extend our
results to more general oligopolistic framework.
4.1. Dynamic Walrasian Strategies
In a residual duopoly,like relative-proﬁtabilityreactions, there exist inﬁnitely many relative-proﬁtabilitystrategies
for each ﬁrm. Among them, the one that requires the minimum information about the market structure turns out to be
the price-taking strategy, which is to react to only the lagged market price by adjusting current marginal cost:




where p is the price and h ≥ 0 is the information lag. The explanation for the delayed reaction function (6) being a
relative-proﬁtability strategy lies in the fact that when an equilibrium is reached with xt = xt−1, Eq. (6) is nothing
but the Walrasian reaction deﬁned in (1). The price-taking strategy certainly belongs to more general category of the
Walrasian strategy, by which we mean:
Definition 7. Dynamic Walrasian strategy: any dynamical strategy (or behavioral rule) that can
guarantees the equality of marginal cost to the market price at any intertemporal equilibrium.
Geometrically, dynamic Walrasian strategy refers to any dynamical behavioral rule that can guarantee that an
intertemporal equilibrium lies on the Walrasian reaction function for a residual duopoly. The dynamic Walrasian
strategy so deﬁned differs from the static one adopted in the evolutionarygame theory. It includes the behavioral rules
and reactions such as simple trial and error procedure, imitating behavior, advanced learning rules, optimal or non-
optimal search behavior, adaptive adjustments, or even dynamic optimizations so long as they can reach to Walrasian
reaction curve in a dynamic equilibrium.
A typical form of dynamic Walrasian strategy is the conventional adaptive adjustment deﬁned by
xt = xt−1 + α
 
MC
−1 (pt−1) − xt−1
 
. (7)
if the marginal cost is not a constant, where α ∈ (0,1) is the adaptive speed2.
2An alternative, but more general adaptive adjustment strategy is
xt = αxt−1 + (1 − α)g
 
pt−1 − C′ (xt−1)
 
where g is a monotonically increasing function with g (0) = 0.
14It needs to emphasize that the relative proﬁtability of dynamic Walrasian strategy can be generalized to more
general heterogenous oligopolistic models where ﬁrms have different costs and strategies. We have the following
beautiful result3:
Theorem 3. In an oligopolistic economy consisting of N ﬁrms that produce an homogeneous product,
assume Firm X has strict convex cost function C and adopts a dynamic Walrasian strategy. If an intertem-
poral equilibrium is arrived, Firm X can proﬁt more than any rival who has identical cost but produces at
diﬀerent equilibrium output level.
Proof. Assume Firm Y to be one of the ﬁrms having the identical cost C as the price-taker. Let ¯ x and
¯ y be the equilibrium outputs of the price-taker and Firm Y, respectively. Denote {¯ qj}N
j=3 as the equilibrium
outputs for the other oligopolistic ﬁrms, with either same or diﬀerent costs, so that the equilibrium price is
given by




It follows from the deﬁnition of dynamic Walrasian strategy that C′(¯ x) = ¯ p.
The proﬁt diﬀerence between Firm X and Firm Y is then given by
∆xy (¯ x, ¯ y) = ¯ p   (¯ x − ¯ y) − (C(¯ x) − C(¯ y)) = C′(¯ x)(¯ x − ¯ y) − (C(¯ x) − C(¯ y)).
It follows from the assumption of C′′( ) > 0 that C′(¯ x)(¯ x − ¯ y) − (C(¯ x) − C(¯ y)) ≥ 0, regardless the relative
magnitudes of ¯ x and ¯ y, or equivalently,
∆xy (¯ x, ¯ y) ≥ 0, (8)
where the equality holds if and only if ¯ x = ¯ y.
Since Firm Y’s production strategy as well as the equilibrium output ¯ y are not explicitly speciﬁed, the
inequality (8) thus leads to the conclusion immediately. Q.E.D.
TheconclusionsdrawninTheorem3isgenericinthesensethatitdependsonneithertheparticularmarketstructure
(the residual demand and cost functions) nor on the strategies (or outputs) that other ﬁrms may take. Moreover, since
only equilibrium is concerned, the result is robust to the changes in the market environments such as the market
demand, entry and exit of oligopolistic ﬁrms, advances in some or overall technology level. Hence, it supersedes all
available conclusions in the relevant literatures. Economical interpretation for the relative proﬁtability of dynamic
Walrasian strategies in general is simple and straightforward: when an intertemporal equilibrium is reached, the price
converges to an equilibrium and remains unchanged. Any sophisticated strategy aiming to affect the market through
3The relative proﬁtability of the price-taking strategy was ﬁrst formally proposed in Huang (2002) where the proof was
mistakenly omitted in the editorial process. The proof itself is quite straightforward. Although the simpliﬁed forms were
reported in several later publications, we again provide a more general form here for the sake of completeness as well as the
appreciation of role of convex cost functions.
15market power ceases to function and becomes in vain. In contrast, MC = P is in fact the unique way to gain the
economic efﬁciency, a fundamental economic principal taught to all undergraduates4
It should be emphasized that the relative proﬁtability is not purposely but unconsciously achieved by a ﬁrm who
adopts a dynamic Walrasian strategy. If a ﬁrm rival intends to maximize its proﬁt relative to a price-taker by adopting
any relative-proﬁtability strategy, both ﬁrms will end up with producing at the residual Walrasian equilibrium level.
When a ﬁrm’s production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, or, equivalently, the ﬁrm’s marginal cost
is constant, the ﬁrm cannot behave as a price-taker with output determined by (6). The following complement to
Theorem 3 can be similarly proved.
Theorem 4. For an oligopolistic economy consisting of N ﬁrms that produce an homogeneous product,
assume Firm X has a constant marginal cost c and adopts the following dynamic Walrasian strategy so that
its output at period t is determined by





t−hj − xt−1), (9)
where g is a monotonically increasing function with g(0) = 0, hj ≥ 1 is the information lag for ﬁrm j’s output,
and q
(j)
t−h, j = 2,...,N, are the lagged outputs of other N − 1 ﬁrms. When an intertemporal equilibrium is
reached, we have the following:
i)Firm X makes normal proﬁt at the equilibrium, so do any ﬁrm has positive equilibrium output;
ii)Any ﬁrm equipped with the same technology as Firm X but adopt traditional strategies such as Cournot
best-response or Stackelberg leader strategy will be driven out the market in general due to loss of proﬁt in
equilibrium.
Proof. i) Let the equilibrium output vector be (¯ x, ¯ q2, ¯ q3,..., ¯ qN). Eq. (9) then implies
c = D(¯ x + ¯ q2 + ... + ¯ qN) (10)
so that the proﬁts for all ﬁrms having cost function C (q) = cq must enjoy normal proﬁts in equilibrium.
ii) Without loss of generality, assume that Firm 2 has the same cost function C (q) = cq and adopts
Cournot best-response (with or without knowledge of the exact outputs of other ﬁrms) so that its output yt
is determined from










t−ljx)   yt = c, (11)
where lj ≥ 0, j = 1,3,...,N are the information lags for Firm Y.
When an intertemporal equilibrium (¯ x, ¯ y, ¯ q3,..., ¯ qN) is reached, (11) simpliﬁes to
D(¯ x + ¯ y + ¯ q3 + ... + ¯ qN) + D′(¯ x + ¯ y + ¯ q3 + ... + ¯ qN)   ¯ y = c. (12)
4Needless to say, if duopoly game is just played with ﬁnite rounds (before reaching the equilibrium), then which ﬁrm has
the relative proﬁtability depends on the length of game as well as the strategies adopted by the sophisticated ﬁrm.
16However, we know from (10) that c = D(¯ x + ¯ y + ¯ q3 + ... + ¯ qN) so that identity (12) suggests that
D′((¯ x + ¯ y + ¯ q3 + ... + ¯ qN)   ¯ y = c,
that is, ¯ y = 0 so long as D′  = 0.
The proof for all other conventional Stackelberg leader strategy follow the same reasoning. Q.E.D.
4.2. Static Walrasian strategy
We can infer directly from the relative-proﬁtability regimes depicted in x-y plane that committing to the residual
Walrasian residual equilibrium output (xt = qw) is itself a simplest relative-proﬁtability strategy. We shall refer it as
the static Walrasian strategy.
In a residual duopoly, deﬁne y1 and y2 as the solutions to πy (qw,y1) = 0 and πx (qw,y2) = 0 respectively.
Referring to Figure 4.2, we see that when Firm X commits its output to qw, the following inequalities exist between
the proﬁts of the two ﬁrms:
i) πx > πy > 0 when y < y1,
ii) πx > 0 > πy when y1 < y < y2,
iii) 0 > πx > πy when y > y2.
The beauty of adopting static Walrasian strategy is more appreciated when the residual demand is linear.
Proposition 5. (Eﬃciency Theorem) When the residual demand function is linear, p = D(Q) =
a − bQ, so long as C′′ ≥ 0 is satisﬁed, the static Walrasian strategy is the eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability
strategy that maximizes the relative proﬁt, regardless of the actual function form of C.
Proof. Since the eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability strategy x = Rr (y) is derived from (4), substituting
D(x + y) = a − b   (x + y) into it yields
C
′ (x) = a − 2bx. (13)
The eﬃcient relative-proﬁtability strategy is therefore to ﬁx its output at a constant that is solved from (13).
However, the residual Walrasian equilibrium outputs xw = yw = qw is determined from
C
′ (qw) = a − 2bqw. (14)
Comparing (14) with (13) leads to the conclusion. Q.E.D.
Therefore, committing to static Walrasian strategy provides a ﬁrm with unbeatable commitment advantage. Given
this information, its rival who is a proﬁt maximizer, has no choice but to produce at y∗ = Rc (qw), where Rc is the
Cournot best response for Firm Y.
Apparently, the relative-proﬁtability as well as the efﬁciency of static Walrasian strategy only holds true when the











πx ≥ πy > 0
πx > 0 > πy
0 > πx > πy
0
D = 1/(x + y), C(q) = cq2/2
(c = 2)
FIG. 4 Static Walrasian strategy
On the other hand, if all ﬁrms have identical cost C, then the static Walrasian strategy, i.e., producing at residual
Walrasian equilibrium output amounts to producing at the competitive equilibrium level5. In fact, if we denote qc as
the competitive equilibrium output level so that
C′ (qc) = ˜ D(Nqc)
then we can see that qc ≡ qw. Therefore, the relative proﬁtability of static Walrasian strategy applies to the symmetric
oligopoly where all ﬁrms have identical cost in the sense that
˜ D((N − k)qc + k¯ q)qc − C (qc) > ˜ D((N − k)qc + kq) ¯ q − C (¯ q). (15)
for all ¯ q  = qc and 1 ≤ k ≤ N.
Inequality(15)was ﬁrst providedin Vega-Redondo(1997),where it was shown that the competitiveequilibriumqc
is a global stable evolutionary strategy in the sense that, starting with all ﬁrms producing at an identical qc, if k ﬁrms
change to defect and produce at another identical output level ¯ q, they will deﬁnitely make less proﬁt than those who
remain in producing at qc. Extending (15) to an n-residual oligopoly, by replacing N with n < N and ˜ D with D, we
arrive at an analogous conclusion: the static Walrasian strategy (producing at qw determined by C′ (qw) = D(nqw) )
is a global stable strategy from the evolutionary game theoretic point of view.
5Producing at the competitive level is commonly referred to as “Walrasian strategy” or “Walrasian behavior” directly in
evolutionary game-theoretic literatures.
185. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF DYNAMIC WALRASIAN STRATEGIES
For the static Walrasian strategy, in comparison to the dynamic Walrasian strategy, an noticeable short-coming is
the former demands more information than the latter because to compute the residual Walrasian equilibrium output
or competitive output, extra information such as (residual) demand and number of ﬁrms are needed. Moreover, the
evolutionarystability ofstatic Walrasian strategyis somewhatmisleading. To see this, we shouldﬁrst notethat concept
of “strategy” adopted in either classical game theory or evolutionary game theory is a “static” concept and is more
often deﬁned as an option of action variable so that the strategies space consists of either a ﬁnite or inﬁnite number of
such choices6. A “strategy” in game-theoretic sense is said to be evolutionarily stable (ESS) if it, once adopted by all
players, will not be discarded in favor of another “strategy” when a small fraction of players (mutants) choose another
single different “strategy”7, as implied by (15), where the relative-proﬁt of producing at the competitive equilibrium
output is checked against one mutant strategy (output level) ¯ q at a time. If more than one mutant strategies appear
simultaneously, such relative proﬁtability may disappear. In other words, if k1 mutants produce at ¯ q1 and k2 mutants
produce at ¯ q2, then it may lead to the following opposite conclusion
˜ D((N − k1 − k2)qc + k1¯ q1 + k2¯ q2)qc − C (qc) < ˜ D((N − k1 − k2)qc + k1¯ q1 + k2¯ q2) ¯ qi − C (¯ qi)
i = 1, or 2.
Such examples can be easily constructed.
Example 3. Consider a symmetric oligopoly consisting of three ﬁrms, X, Y and Z, the output bundle is
a vector of (x,y,z). Assume that the market inverse demand is given by ˜ D(Q) = 3/Q, where Q = x+y +z
and that the identical cost is quadratic: C (q) = q2/2 for q > 0.
It follows from ˜ D(3qc) = C′ (qc) that the Walrasian equilibrium output level qc = 1.




z = 5 − y − z : y(6 − y (1 + y + z)) : z (6 − z (1 + y + z)).
6Such usage is diﬀerent from the much broader “strategy” understood in common sense. In particular, in other ﬁelds of
economics, “strategy” is commonly refer to some kind of behavioral rule in response to changes resulted from rival’s actions,
market condition or external environment. In dynamic framework, it is usually expressed as a reaction function, such as the
Cournot-best response (responding to rival’s output or price), price-taking strategy and/or Cobweb strategy (responding to
market price), adaptive and/or cautious-strategy (responding to unstable economy). This distinction is particularly clear for
“Cournot-best response” that used both in game theory and in oligopolistic dynamics. In the former, all the quantities resulted
from the response function are “strategies”, while in the latter, the “best-reponse” itself is a strategy (like price-taking strategy),
one of many “strategies” formed by diﬀerent responses .
7The principal notions of evolutionary stability have evolved constantly. The idea of Evolutionarily stable strategies can be
at least traced back to Ronald Fisher (1930). the formal deﬁnition were introduced by John Maynard Smith and George R.
Price in a 1973 Nature paper, in which a strategy S is deﬁned as an ESS if and only if, for all T  = S, either i) E(S,S) > E(T,S),
or ii) E(S,S) = E(T,S) and E(S,T) > E(T,T), where T stands for any strategy and E( , ) is the expected payoﬀ.
The ﬁrst condition is sometimes called a strict Nash equilibrium condition or equilibrium property to indicate that the best
strategy to face strategy S is also strategy S. The second is sometimes referred to as Maynard Smith’s second condition or
stability property, which emphasizes that if T does just as well against S as does S itself, then S will only be stable if it does
better against T than T does against itself. In consequence, although the adoption of strategy T is neutral with respect to the
payoﬀ against strategy S, the population of players who continue to play strategy S have an advantage when playing against
T.
There are many alternative deﬁnitions of ESS in diﬀerent applications. They are not precisely equivalent to each other. For








FIG. 5 Illustration of Example 3
We see that πy > πx when (1 − y)
 
y2 + yz + 2y − 5 + z
 
> 0 and that πz > πx when (1 − z)
 
z2 + yz + 2z − 5 + y
 
>
0. Therefore, there exist inﬁnitely many (y,z) combinations such that make one of Firm Y and Z makes
more proﬁt than Firm X. Figure 5 illustrates the situation.
On the other hand, given any z, residual demand left for Firm X and Y is D(Q) = 3/(Q + z) and the
residual Walrasian equilibrium is obtained from the equilibrium condition D(2qw) = C′ (qw), which yields
qw = (
√
z2 + 24 − z)/4. Now for x ≡ qw, we have
πx − πy =
1
32
(4y + z −
√




z2 + 24 + 3z + 4y
≥ 0
for arbitrary y and z, where the equality holds if and only if y = qw.
Suppose, instead, Firm X behaves as a price-taker, then for any given y and z, the equilibrium output ¯ x is











3 + y2  
(y + z)
2 + 12 + y2 (y + z) − (15y + 3z)
 
(y + z)
2 + 12 + y + z
≥ 0
where the equality holds if and only if y = ¯ x = qw. Similarly, πx ≥ πy and the equality holds if and only
z = ¯ x = qw.
In additional to its weakness to against multiple mutants, static Walrasian strategy has another two shortcomings:
i) Robustness issue: accordingto Proposition4, when the (residual) market demand changes or when entry or exit
occur, the relative-proﬁtability frontier shifts outward or inward, leading to the displacement of relative-proﬁtability
20regime. Therefore, relative-proﬁtability advantage in committing at the original Walrasian equilibrium output level
may not be maintained;
ii) Heterogeneous costs: unlike the dynamic Walrasian strategy deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7, the relative proﬁtability
of the static Walrasian strategy cannot be generalizedto the non-symmetricoligopoly where ﬁrms have heterogeneous
costs.
The implication between the dynamic and static Walrasian strategies can be seen straightforwardly by comparing
(15) with the conclusions drawn in Theorem 3. When all ﬁrms have identical convex cost C, assume that k ﬁrms
producing at arbitrary amounts ¯ q1, ¯ q2,...¯ qk, while remain N − k ﬁrms produce at the dynamical equilibrium level x
determined from
C




then Theorem 3 implies that, for all i = 1,2...,k, so long as ¯ qi  = x, we have
˜ D((N − k) ¯ x +
k  
j=1
¯ qj)¯ x − C (¯ x) > ˜ D((N − k) ¯ qj +
k  
j=1
¯ qj)¯ qi − C (¯ qi), (17)
The distinctions between (15) and (17) are apparent. However, the implications from (17) is far broader than the
one from (15) in the sense that the latter can be logically inferred from the former either when “imitation” is assumed
or whena payoffmonotoneevolutionaryselectionmechanismis enforced. As in the evolutionarygameanalysis where
all ﬁrms seek to maximize relative proﬁt, ﬁrms intend to imitate the successors by changing to the output levels that
brings greater relativeproﬁt, (15)is then a long-runevolutionaryoutcomefrom (17)due to the fact that, along with the
increasing number of “price-takers”, the equilibrium output level ¯ x derived from (16) will approach the competitive
equilibrium qc. After all ﬁrms become price-takers, ¯ x = qc, any arbitrary deviation from qc by any number of ﬁrms
may promoteshort-termrelative-proﬁtabilityagainst the price-takers(herethe price-takerswill react to these deviation
instead of sticking to qc) but deﬁnitely ends up with a relative disadvantage status in terms of relative proﬁt, should a
new equilibrium be arrived. At this new equilibrium, the mutants may proﬁt more or less than they do at the original
equilibrium. Regardless of which case it is, in terms of the relative proﬁtability, the mutants still performs worse than
the “price-takers”. In the long-run, by repeated imitations or selections, the competitive equilibrium is converged.
The converse implication, that is, from (15) to (17), does not exist. For instance, for a duopoly, (15) refers to the
relative-proﬁtability of qw while (17) refers to the relative proﬁtability of fw.
Just as the concepts of “static strategy” deﬁned in the game theory should be distinguished with the “dynamic
strategy” deﬁned in our model, the distinctions between the concept of “strategy equilibrium” adopted in game the-
oretical analysis and the concept of “intertemporal equilibrium” adopted in dynamical analysis should also be noted.
“Equilibrium” in game theory is interpreted in terms of static “strategies”. A ESS is essentially a Nash-equilibrium
with respect to the relative payoffs, which refers to the situation in which that you have no incentive to change your
“strategy” (i.e., the output level in quantity-competition)when your rival sticks to his current “strategy”. However, the
“intertemporalequilibrium”that we concernhere is a dynamic concept. It is nothing but a “steady state” resulted from
21mutual adjustments. When an intertemporal equilibrium is locally stable, if you change, your rival will react, and then
the game will revert to whatever it was before. So it is not because you don’t have incentive to change but because
your rival always reacts properly to your change so as to make your change in vain and force you to adjust back to the
original equilibrium status. The intertemporal equilibrium coincides with Nash-equilibrium if and only if all players
adopted their respectively best-response strategies (such as Cournot reaction)8.
Nevertheless, the conventional concept of evolutionary stability for static Walrasian strategy can be generalized to
the dynamic Walrasian strategy as well. As we have emphasized repeatedly, except adopting Walrasian reaction di-
rectly, Walrasian strategy in general does not guarantee the relative proﬁtability at each period of interaction. While an
impatient imitator may not switch to the Walrasian strategy during the dynamical adjustment course, rational imitators
will soon realize that it is always the long-runoutcome that accounts and hence only imitate the strategy that can bring
relatively higher proﬁt when the system converges to a relatively stable state, i.e., a dynamical equilibrium. Along
with the course of evolution, more and more ﬁrms become rational imitators and the Walrasian strategy evolves into
an evolutionary stable strategy.
6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
We have provedthat there exists a uniquedownward-slopingrelative-proﬁtabilityfrontier,which togetherwith 45-
degree diagonal line, divides the output space into symmetrically located relative-proﬁtability regimes for each ﬁrm.
All relative-proﬁtability reactions for a particular ﬁrm must pass through the residual Walrasian equilibrium, which
happens to be the unique vertex that separates different relative-proﬁtability regimes. Regardless of what strategies
its rival may take, a ﬁrm behaving as a price-taker can achieve the relative proﬁtability if an equilibrium is reached.
Producing at the Walrasian output constantly, however, can bring about the relative proﬁt at each and every period.
Moreover,whentheresidualdemandis linear,suchcommitmenttoinvariantoutputturnsouttobetheefﬁcientreaction
in the sense that it unconsciously maximizes the relative proﬁt against its rival.
These fundamental facts provide a direct economic interpretation and intuitive justiﬁcation for the appreciation of
Walrasian behavior from the different perspectives and provide a linkage between them. They do not only clarify the
confusions and misunderstandings due to the different usages of same terminologies under different frameworks but
also help to generalize the available results to a new level.
The relative proﬁtability gained by a price-taker is conventionally interpreted as a consequence of betrayal and
free-riding (Stigler 1950). It is well-known that in a cartel, any member has an incentive to increase its output above
the agreed level so as to gain extra proﬁt. The higher relative proﬁt enjoyed by a betrayer (a price-taker) is achieved
throughhurtingthosewhoremaininthecollusionmorethanhurtingitself9. Inotherwords,thepricepaidforbetraying
is the reduction in instantaneous absolute proﬁt. Such observations lead to the questioning of the rationale of price-
taking strategy, in particular for the economists who believe the absolute proﬁtability is what a ﬁrm should concern.
8The price-taking reaction can be regarded as a best-response strategy in boarder sense: it is the reaction best-response to
the price instead to the outputs of rivals.
9This behavior is described as “spiteful” in Schaﬀer (1989).
22However, when the number of ﬁrms in an oligopoly is relative large, a ﬁrm may prefer to behave as a “price-taker”
not just for the higher relative proﬁt compared to the rest but also for higher instantaneous proﬁt. In the terminology
of game-theory, the “price-taking” can be a dominant strategy for some ﬁrms when the oligopoly is composed of
price-takers and sophisticated ﬁrms that adopt Cournot best-response strategy and the price-takers. Such observation
is ﬁrst revealed in Huang (2002) and will be further explored in the second part of this research, where the advantage
of price-taking strategy against conventional sophisticated strategies such as Cournot best-response and collusion will
be further explored.
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248. APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1
Without loss of generality, we proceed with the case in which y < x since the proof for the case in which y > x
follows directly due to the symmetry of x and y.
Let y = fw (x) be the inverse function of the Walrasian reaction deﬁned in (1). This implies that the curve on x-y
plane satisﬁes the following identity:
D(x + fw (x)) = C
′ (x).
First, we shall show that fe (x) ≥ fw (x) for all x ∈ Q and the equality holds only when fe (x) = x. In other
words, given any level of y, fe lies on the right-hand side of fw.
Notice that by the deﬁnition of ∆xy (x,fe (x)) = 0, we have
∆
xy (x,fe (x)) = (x − fe (x))D(x + fe (x)) − (C (x) − C (fe (x))) = 0.
So fe (x) has an implicitly deﬁned solution of
fe (x) = x −
C (x) − C (fe (x))
D(x + fe (x))
Or, equivalently, D(x + fe (x)) = (C (x) − C (fe (x)))/(x − fe (x)).
With the convexity of C, we have
C (x) − C (fe (x))
x − fe (x)
≤ C′ (x) for x ≥ fe (x),
where the equality holds only when fe (x) = x, therefore
D(x + fe (x)) ≤ C′ (x) = D(x + fw (x)).
The downward-sloping property of D implies that fw (x) ≤ fe (x), with the equality being held when fe (x) = x.
Therefore, for a given x and fe < x, we have fe lies above fw. This is equivalent to saying that fe lies on the
right-hand side of fw for any given y.
To provethe uniquenessof fe, we ﬁrst show that forany ﬁxed y, ∆xy (x,y) is a monotonicallydecreasingfunction
of x for x > f−1
w (y).
Given a ﬁxed x, we have D(x + y) ≶ C′ (x) when y ≷ fw (x), or, equivalently, given a y, D(x + y) ≶ C′ (x)
when x ≷ f−1
w (y). However, for any ﬁxed y, we have
∂∆xy (x,y)
∂x
= D − C′ (x) + (x − y)D′.
Due to x > y (by assumption) and the fact that D(x + y) ≶ C′ (x) for x ≷ f−1
w (y), we know that
∂∆xy (x,y)
∂x
< 0 when x > f
−1
w (y).
25This implies that ∆xy (x,y) is a monotonically decreasing function of x for x > f−1
w (y). Therefore, for any ﬁxed y,
when x is greater than the value implied by the curve x = f−1
e (y) (∆xy (x,y) = 0), ∆xy (x,y) is always negative.
Since it is impossible to have ∆xy (x,y) = 0 for x > f−1
e (y), uniqueness of fe is ensured.
ii) The downward sloping characteristics of fe follows straightforwardly from the uniqueness of fe. If not, there
must exist a x0 such that f′
e (x0) = 0 with f′′
e (x0) > 0. This in turn implies the existence of a ǫ → 0+ such that for
yǫ = f−1
e (x0) + ǫ, f−1
e (yǫ) has multiple values, a contradiction.
iii) The intersection of the trivial equal proﬁtability curve and the relative-proﬁtability frontier gives rise to x =
y = qw. The rest of conclusions are obvious. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (2) is obtained by rearrangement after taking derivative with respect to x over both sides of the
identity
D(x + fe)(x − fe) = C (x) − C (fe).
Consider the segment of y = fe (x) below the 45-degree line, we have y < x and C′ (x) ≥ D > C′ (y),
which implies that f′






C′ (x) − D − (x − fe)D′
C′ (fe) − D + (x − fe)D′ = lim
x→qw, y→qw
C′ (x) − D
C′ (fe) − D
= −1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For an arbitrary D that satisﬁes D(0) > b, when C (q) = a + bq + cq2 and y = fe (x), we have
∆xy (x,y) = D(x + y)   (x − y) − b   (x − y) − c  
 
x2 − y2 
= 0.
Therefore, for x  = y, we have
D(x + y) − c   (x + y) = b (18)
which implies that
D(x + y) = ˆ D−1 (b)
where ˆ D−1 is the inverse function deﬁned by ˆ D(z) ˙ =D(z) − cz. Therefore, the equal-proﬁtability curve fe
is always linear, regardless of the residual demand D.
When c = 0, (18) simpliﬁes to
D(x + y) = b = C′ (x) = C′ (y)
which is nothing but the Walrasian reaction curve for both Firm X and Y. It is also the normal-proﬁtability
curves for both ﬁrms due to zero ﬁxed cost. Q.E.D.
26Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. i) For a given x, denote C(2) (x) = (1 + α)C(1) (x). When α  = 0, the equal-proﬁtability curve
fe (α,x) is implicitly deﬁned by
(x − fe (α,x))D(x + fe (α,x)) = (1 + α)(C (x) − C (fe (α,x))). (19)




C (x) − C (fe (α,x))
(1 + α)C′ (fe (α,x)) + (x − fe (α,x))D′ − D
=
C (x) − C (fe (α,x))
(1 + α)(C′ (fe (α,x)) −
C (x) − C (fe (α,x))
x − fe (α,x)
) + (x − fe (α,x))D′
Since the convexity of C implies that
C (x) − C (fe (α,x))
x − fe (α,x)




< 0 for all α.
ii) Since for any given z = x+y, we are able to deﬁne a β (z) such that D(2) (z) = (1 + β (z))D(1) (z), the
proof can be accomplished by showing that fe, which is a function of β (z), shifts rightwards with increasing
β (z) when the residual demand function is given by (1 + β)D(z). Now the equal-proﬁtability curve fe (β,x)
is implicitly deﬁned by
(x − fe (β,x))(1 + β)D(x + fe (β,x)) = C (x) − C (fe (β,x)). (20)




(x − fe (β,x))D(x + fe (β,x))
C (x) − C (fe (β,x))
x − fe (β,x)
− C′ (fe (β,x)) − (x − fe (β,x))(1 + β)D′
> 0
for all β. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Veriﬁcation of i) and iii) are straightforward by noticing that when (21) is satisﬁed, the proﬁt from
Firm X is given by πx (x,fw (x)) = C′ (x)x−C (x) and ∆xy (x,y)|y=fw(x) = C′ (x)(x − y)−(C (x) − C (fw (x))).




′′ (x)y + (C













′ (x) − C
′ (y))(C
′′ (x) − D
′)).
27Therefore so long as x ≤ qw (x ≤ y) we have
dπy (x,y)
dx
> 0. Since πy (qw,qw) > 0 and πy (x∗,0) = 0, πy
must have at least one local maximum between qw and x∗ = Rw (0). One of such local maximum occurs at
xs > qw with
dπy (xs,ys)
dx
|ys=fw(xs) = 0, that is, Eq. (22).
Moreover it can be veriﬁed that
d2πy (x,y)
dx2 |y=fw(x) = D′C′′ (x)(2C′′ (x) − 2D′ − yD′′) − C′′ (y)(C′′ (x) − D′)
2
+ (D′ (C′′′ (x) + D′′) − 2D′′C′′ (x))(C′ (x) − C′ (y))
which is negative for all y = fw (x) when conditions (23) are satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Notice that Rw, Rr and Rc meet the following identities, respectively.
C
′ (Rw (y)) = D(Rw (y) + y),
C
′ (Rr (y)) = D(Rr (y) + y) + (Rr (y) − y)D
′ (Rr (y) + y),
C
′ (Rc (y)) = D(Rc (y) + y) + Rc (y)D
′ (Rc (y) + y).
It is easy to see that for any given y, we have Rc (y) < Rw (y) and Rc (y) < Rr (y). However, Rr (y) and
Rw (y) intersect at x = y = qw. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 6 that, for a given y, the function
of G(x) ˙ =D(x + y) + (x − y)D′ (x + y) lies above (below) D(x + y) for x < y (x > y), which implies that
Rr (y), the intersection of G and C′, is greater (less) than Rw (y) if x < y (x > y). Q.E.D.
9. APPENDIX B: ISO-PROFIT CURVE AND RELATIVE-PROFITABILITY FRONTIER
In this appendix, we shall reveal some relations among iso-proﬁt curve, the normal-proﬁt curves and the equal-
proﬁtability curve. The information revealed is important for the analysis of interactions of various strategies adopted
by the duopolistic ﬁrms.
Definition 8. Iso-proﬁt curve and normal-proﬁt curve for Firm i
Iso-proﬁt curve for Firm i is the curve in the x-y plane that depicts the relationship between x and y so
that the proﬁt for Firm i is ﬁxed at a constant level πi (x,y) = π0, where π0 is a constant. In particular,
when π0 = 0, the iso-proﬁt curve will be referred to as the normal-proﬁtability curve.
Let qw be the residual Walrasian equilibrium output such that D(2qw) = C′ (qw) and denote Ew = (qw,qw) as
the residual Walrasian equilibrium point in the x-y plane. Furthermore, let qn represents the maximum q such that
πx (qn,qn) = πy (qn,qn) = 0, that is, qn satisﬁes the identity


















(b) x > y
FIG. 6 Relative magnitudes of Rr, Rc and Rw
The analytical relationship between iso-proﬁt curve and equal proﬁtability curves is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 6. i) Along the 45-degree line, only at residual Walrasian equilibrium (qw,qw) will the slope
of iso-proﬁt curves of both ﬁrms equal −1. In other words, at the residual Walrasian equilibrium (qw,qw),
the iso-proﬁt curves (for both ﬁrms) are tangent to the equal-proﬁtability curve.
Proof. For the iso-proﬁt curve of Firm X, we have
πx (x,y) = xD(x,y) − C (x)
The slope of πx (x,y) is given by











C′ (x) − D
xD′ (x,y)
− 1.
Since y = x along the 45-degree line, we thus have ∂y/∂x = −1 if and only if C′ (x) = D, i.e., if and only
if at the residual Walrasian equilibrium. Q.E.D.
When x ∈ (qw,qn), the proﬁt is positive. The iso-proﬁt curvewill intersect twice with the equal-proﬁtabilitycurve
fe. The following proposition indicates that these two intersection points are anti-symmetric.




























































(b) Linear demand D(Q) = 1 − Q
FIG. 7 Iso-proﬁt and Equal-Proﬁtability curves (C(q) = q2/2)
30the equal proﬁtability curve y = fe (x) such that
∆xy (q1,fe (q1)) = ∆xy (fe (q1),q1) = ∆xy (˜ q, ˜ q)
and
πi (q1,fe (q1)) = πi (fe (q1),q1) = πi (˜ q, ˜ q) for i = x,y.
Proof. As depicted in Figure7.(a), the normal-proﬁt curve πx (x,y) = 0 passes (qn,qn), (q∗,0) and (0,q∗)
three points.
For any qn > ˜ q ≥ qw, πi (˜ q, ˜ q) > 0, we are able to identify a q1 on the lower segment of y = fe (x) such
that πx (q1,fe (q1)) = πx (˜ q, ˜ q). By the symmetricity of πx (x,y) and πy (y,x) and the anti-symmetricity of
∆xy = 0, we must have
π
x (q1,fe (q1)) = π
y (fe (q1),q1) = π
x (fe (q1),q1)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the symmetricity of πx (x,y) and πy (x,y) and the second one from
∆xy = 0. Q.E.D.
Remark 3. The proﬁts levels along y = fe (x) thus ranges from 0 to πw. Unless y = x, any strategy that
results in y  = x and consequently ∆xy = 0 results in a proﬁt that is less than the Walrasian proﬁt.
To see the relationship between iso-proﬁtability curve and iso-proﬁts curves for the case of residual Walrasian
equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium and collusive equilibrium, we let qc denote the identical Cournot equilibrium output
when both ﬁrms adopt Cournot strategy where qc satisﬁes the following identity:
D(2qc) + qcD′ (2qc) = C′ (qc),




On the other hand, denote qu as the average collusive output when both ﬁrms collude as a Cartel, where qu is
determined from
D(2qu) + 2quD′ (2qu) = C′ (qu),
then it can be veriﬁed that the iso-proﬁt curve is tangent to the 45degree line at qu (at which π (x,x) reaches its
maximum value).
Figure7(a)and(b)illustratetherelationshipbetweenequal-proﬁtabilitycurveandiso-proﬁtscurvesforthecase of
residual Walrasian equilibrium, Cournot equilibrium and collusive equilibrium in x-y plane for the iso-elastic residual
demand(D(Q) = 1/Q)and the linear residual demandD(Q) = 1−Q, respectively. To see how proﬁt level changes
along the 45-degree line, the proﬁt functions are depicted underneath the respective graphs.
31Notice that, when there is no ﬁxed cost, the intercepts of the equal-proﬁtability curve y = fe (x) at x and y axes,
denotes as x∗ and y∗ respectively, satisfy the following identities:
D(x∗) = C (x∗)/x∗, D(y∗) = C (y∗)/y∗,
and consequently,we have πx = πy = 0 at these two extremepoints. In other words, we knowthe normal-proﬁtcurve
for X (Y) must intersect at x∗ (y∗).
10. APPENDIX C: CHARACTERIZATION OF WALRASIAN REACTION
In a residual-duopolyin which Firm X exercises the Walrasian strategy, regardless of whether the productiontech-
nologyexhibits constant return or decreasing return to scale, Walrasian reaction deﬁned by (1) is where an equilibrium
outcome (¯ x, ¯ y) lies on. The following proposition characterizes the shape of Walrasian reaction curve.
Proposition 8. When D′ < 0 and C′′ ≥ 0 are satisﬁed, the inverse of the Walrasian reaction y = fw (x)
implicitly deﬁned by
D(x + fw (x)) = C
′ (x) (21)
has the following properties10:
i) fw is a downward sloping curve with a slope greater than unity in absolute value, i.e.,
f′
w (¯ x) = C′′ (¯ x)/D′ − 1 < −1;
ii) f′′





2 D′′ − C′′′ (¯ x)
 
, which is positive if D′′ ≥ 0 and C′′′ ≤ 0.
Proof. Direct veriﬁcation.
Remark 4. |f′
w (¯ x)| > 1 implies that when x increases, the reduction of y exceeds the increment of x so
that the industrial output decreases and the market price increases.
Remark 5. Conditions D′′ ≥ 0 and C′′′ ≤ 0 are just suﬃcient but not necessary conditions for the
convexity of fw. For instance, when D = 1 − Q and C (q) = q3, we have C′′′ (q) > 0 but f′′
w (x) = 2x−4 > 0.
The graph of fw is depicted in Fig. 2.(c).
Since we are more interested in the relative change of proﬁts and the relative proﬁts along the Walrasian reaction
curve, we have
Proposition 9. Along the Walrasian reaction curve whose inverse is given by y = fw (x), we have
i) πx is a monotonically increasing function of x with
dπx
dx
|y=fw(x) = xC′′ (x) so that πx achieves its
maximum at x∗ = Rw (0);
10For the Walrisian reaction, we have
R′
w (y) = D′/
 




D′′ (C′′ (¯ x))
2 − (D′)
2 C′′′ (x)
(C′′ (x) − D′)
3 .
32ii) πy is a monotonically increasing function of x when x < y (i.e, x < qw) and it achieves a local
maximum at xs > qw that is implicitly deﬁned by




′′y < 0, D
′′ > 0 and C
′′′ < 0, (23)
then xs is the unique maximum.
iii)
d∆xy (¯ x, ¯ y)
dx
|y=fw(x) = C′′ (x)(x − y) − (C′ (x) − C′ (y))f′
w so that
d∆xy (¯ x, ¯ y)
dx
|y=fw(x) ≷ 0 if x ≷ qw).
The relative proﬁt between two ﬁrms, however, is a monotonically increasing and decreasing function of x when
x is greater or less than qw, respectively which is consistent with the fact that the relative proﬁt difference reaches to
its minimum (zero) at the residual Walrasian equilibrium Ew.
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that for a symmetric duopoly with Firm X exercising Walrasian strategy, a
local maximum proﬁt is achieved when Firm Y behaves as a quasi-Stackelberg leader in the way that the Walrasian
reaction curve Rw is known to Firm Y and is taken into consideration in its proﬁt maximization strategy. Instead of
proceeding to the relevant proof, we introduce a more general result related to strategically related parameter.
Proposition 10. Comparative statics for a strategic parameter γi
When D′ < 0 and C′′ > 0 is satisﬁed, for an equilibrium established by (21) and
D − h({γi}, ¯ x, ¯ y) = C′ (¯ y) (24)


















¯ H ˙ =C′′ (¯ x)C′′ (¯ y) − D′ (C′′ (¯ x) + C′′ (¯ y)) + (∂h/∂x − ∂h/∂y)D′, (27)
is nonnegative if
∂h/∂x ≤ ∂h/∂y. (28)
As an application of Proposition 10, we examine the traditional reaction by Firm Y that can be uniﬁed with
conjectural variation formulation. In general, assume that Firm Y’s reaction curve is implicitly deﬁned by
D + (α + βR′
w (y)) ¯ yD′ = C′ (¯ y)
with α ≥ β ≥ 0.
33While Cournot best-response corresponds to the case in which α = 1 and β = 0, Stackelberg-alike strategy is
characterized by α = β = 1.
Forﬁxedα andβ, let h(α,β,x,y) = −¯ yD′ (¯ x + ¯ y)(α + βR′
w (y)), thenwe haveh(α,β,x,y) > 0 if 0 ≤ β < α
(due to |R′
w (y)| < 1).
∂h/∂x − ∂h/∂y = [
(+)




It follows from Proposition 8 that if D′′ > 0 and C′′′ < 0, we have R′′
w (y) > 0, which in turn implies that
∂h/∂x < ∂h/∂y.
Due to the facts that
∂h(α,β,x,y)
∂α




w (y) < 0,




′ (1 + R
′
w (y)) > 0
for α = β, we are able to get the following comparative statics immediately from Theorem 9 and Proposition 10:
β < α α = β
∂/∂β ∂/∂α ∂/∂α
x − + +
y + − −
πx − + +
∆πxy − + +
In particular, for α = β = 1, substituting D with C′ (x) in (24) and rearrange gives us
C
′ (¯ x) + ¯ yD
′(1 +
D′
C′′ (¯ x) − D′) = C
′ (¯ y)
which is nothing but the ﬁrst-order maximization condition for πy given by (22). That is to say that Stackelberg alike
strategy (taking into account the reaction curve Rw) leads to the maximum proﬁt for Firm Y, which is at least true
when Walrasian reaction curve is convex.
34